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STATE AID, THE GROWTH OF LOW-COST CARRIERS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE IMPACT OF THE
2005 GUIDELINES ON FINANCING OF AIRPORTS AND




T HE DEVELOPMENT of an efficient, low-cost transportation
network is central to the European Community's stated goal
of establishing a common market "to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it."1 In the last decade, Eu-
rope's air transportation sector has undergone radical changes.
Increasing liberalization and the expansion of the European
Union ("EU") has increased domestic competition, accelerated
the addition of new routes, and lowered ticket prices for
consumers.
European airlines have historically been heavily subsidized
and, in many cases, owned by national governments. 2 Because
of the large number of people employed by airlines, the social
consequences of staff reductions, and state involvement in air-
lines, there was significant resistance to liberalization of air
transportation in Europe.' Air carriers were often seen as a tool
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2007.
1 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 2, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Competition in the Air: European Union Regulation of
Commercial Aviation, 66J. AIR L. & CoM. 979, 983 (2001) [hereinafter Competition
in the Air].
John Balfour, State Aid to Airlines-A Question of Law or Politics, 15 Y.B. EUR. L.
157, 168 (1995).
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to promote public policy objectives.4 These objectives included
increasing tourism, reducing unemployment, enhancing na-
tional security, and promoting domestic aircraft manufactur-
ing.5 By the 1980s, the European Community began to move
toward liberalization,6 and in 1994 the European Community's
"third package" of liberalization rules significantly changed the
structure of Europe's airline industry.7 In particular, the third
package addressed state aid to airlines and the danger state aid
posed to a liberalized market.8
In the midst of increasing liberalization, low-cost air carriers
like Ryanair and easyjet-modeling themselves on American
budget airlines like Southwest and AirTran-took advantage of
Europe's new, increasingly competitive air transport market.9 In
the past decade, the number of low-cost, no-frills carriers has
grown exponentially, and low-cost carriers now account for ap-
proximately 20% of the European Union's air transport market
share.' 0 While this number lags behind the low-cost market
share in the United States, where approximately 30% of the do-
mestic market share is controlled by low-cost carriers, trends in
the United Kingdom indicate that low-cost carriers will continue
to gain market share in mainland Europe."1
While concerns with state aid initially centered on subsidies,
bailouts, and other aid given to flagship carriers by their corre-
sponding states, one recent, high-profile state-aid decision, the
4 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies": The Deregulation of Inter-
national Air Transport, 12 TRANSP. LJ. 305, 362-63 (1987).
5 Id.
6 Competition in the Air, supra note 2, at 983.
7 Arthur Reed, Liberalization After 2 Years: The European Airline Industry's March
Toward the Open Skies Is Slowed by Recession, Falling Fares and State Aid, AIR TRANsP.
WORLD, Jan. 1995, at 45, 46.
8 Competition in the Air, supra note 2, at 1124.
9 Turbulent Skies, ECONOMIST, Jul. 10, 2004, at 68, available at http://www.econ-
omist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story-id=2897525.
10 Community Guidelines on Financing ofAirports and Start-Up Aid to Airlines Depart-
ingfrom Regional Airports, 2005 OJ. (C 312) 1, 16 [hereinafter 2005 Guidelines].
'1 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands were the standard bearers for
liberalization in Europe, entering into a number of bilateral transport agree-
ments with other nations in the 1980s. Competition in the Air, supra note 2, at 987.
In 2003, low-cost carriers accounted for approximately forty percent of service
touching the United Kingdom. The Directorate-General of Energy & Transport
[DG TRen], DG TREN-ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
2003, FINAL REPORT 103 (2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trans-
port/air/rules/doc/2003_annualreport-en.pdf [hereinafter 2003 DG Tren
Report].
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Ryanair decision, involved state aid to low-cost carriers.' 2 The
circumstances surrounding the Ryanair decision reflect the busi-
ness model of low-cost carriers, and the outcome reveals a con-
flict between two of the European Union's policies: raising the
standard of living and achieving an internal market free from
distortion. In response to the Ryanair decision, the European
Commission ("Commission") released guidelines addressing aid
granted to publicly owned regional airports and start-up aid
given to airlines departing from those airports.'
This paper examines the European Community and the Euro-
pean Union's movement towards air transport liberalization and
the growth of low-cost air carriers in Europe. In particular, this
paper will focus on the evolution of the Commission's stance on
state aid to airlines, the effect of low-cost carriers on the way the
Commission thinks about state aid, and the impact that the new
guidelines on state aid will likely have on the growth of low-cost
carriers and secondary airports in Europe.
This paper will begin with a brief discussion of low-cost carri-
ers, focusing on their business model and recent success. Next I
will discuss the Commission's 1994 paper on state aid in the avia-
tion sector and the implication of those guidelines on new en-
trants to the air transport market. The paper will then segway
into recent developments in state aid as it relates to air trans-
port, focusing on the Commission's 2004 decision relating to
benefits given to Ryanair by the Walloon Region and Brussels
South Charleroi Airport. Finally, I will discuss the Commission's
2005 guidelines on state aid to regional airports and start-up aid
to air carriers, and how these guidelines might impact low-cost
carriers.
II. LOW-COST CARRIERS
In 1971, Herb Kelleher decided to launch "a different kind of
airline."' 4 Thirty-five years later, his airline, Southwest Airlines,
is the model for low-cost carriers. Since the deregulation of the
United States air transport market in 1976 and the European air
transport market in 1994, low-cost carriers, led by Southwest,
12 Commission Decision 2004/393/EC, Commission Decision of 12 Februar), 2004
Concerning Advantages Granted by the Walloon Region and Brussels South Charleroi Air-
port to the Airline Ryanair in Connection with Its Establishment at Charleroi, 2004 O.J.
(L 137) 1, 1 (EU) [hereinafter Ryanair Decision].
'3 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10, 19.
Southwest.com, We Weren't Just Airborne Yesterday, http://wwv.sotthwest.
com/about-swa/airborne.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
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have played a significant role in the increased efficiency of air
carriers, expansion of air services, and lower costs to consumers.
A. THE Low-CoST BUSINESS MODEL
The business model employed by low-cost carriers has allowed
them to take advantage of lower costs, keep downward pressure
on airfare, and has forced legacy carriers to provide more con-
sistent service. Low-cost carriers operate far more efficiently
than legacy carriers. For instance, the United States' largest car-
rier, American Airlines, operates at a significant cost disadvan-
tage to its low-cost competition. American's costs on domestic
flights are 26.9% higher than Southwest and 62.5% higher than
JetBlue. 5
While there is no unified business model for low-cost carriers,
two elements typify the low-cost business model: simple products
and low operating costs. Low-cost carrier business practices in-
clude: a single passenger class, a single type of airplane, a simple
fare scheme, unreserved seating, flights to secondary airports,
point-to-point rather than hub and spoke networks, emphasis on
direct ticket sales, and elimination of in-flight meals and other
in-flight services.
Traditionally, low-cost carriers have relied on secondary air-
ports to help keep operating costs low. Secondary airports have
several advantages over large primary airports. First, secondary
airports usually charge lower landing and service fees. 16 Airport
fees are a significant portion of an airline's costs, so low-cost air-
lines typically fly into secondary airports to take advantage of the
lower fees. 7 Low-cost carriers also utilize secondary airports to
help increase efficiency. Secondary airports are typically less
congested than primary airports, which allows low-cost carriers
to reduce turnaround times and ultimately leads to higher daily
aircraft utilization.'8
15 Eric Torbenson, Airline Industry Transforming, BRADENTON HERALD, Nov. 6,
2005, at 4, available at 2005 WLNR 17935215.
16 Triant Flouris & Thomas John Walker, The Financial Performance of Low-Cost
and Full-Service Airlines in Times of Crisis, CAN. J. ADMIN. Sci., Mar. 1, 2005, at 3, 6,
available at 2005 WLNR 8154827.
17 Id.
18 Id. (noting that "[l]egacy carriers have a turnaround time of more than 45
minutes whereas [low-cost carriers] frequently achieve the same task in less than
30 minutes").
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Low-cost carriers often reduce operating costs by flying only
one type of aircraft with one type of engine.'" There are many
advantages to operating one type of aircraft. First, the cost of
training pilots, flight attendants, and maintenance crews is re-
duced because training on multiple types of aircraft is unneces-
sary.2 ° Maintenance costs are minimized when there is only one
type of plane in a fleet because spare parts can be ordered in
large quantities. 2' A uniform fleet also leads to increased oper-
ating efficiency because pilots, crews and mechanics become
more familiar with the aircraft.22
Low-cost carriers also keep costs low by offering a simple
product. Elimination of first- and business-class tickets and re-
served seating helps increase efficiency. Turnaround time is re-
duced at boarding because separate boarding for different
classes of tickets is inapplicable, and because seats are not re-
served, passengers are encouraged to hurry to obtain preferred
seating.2- By eliminating first- and business-classes, airplanes
owned by low-cost carriers tend to have a higher seat density.24
Finally, low-cost carriers lower their costs by eliminating compli-
mentary services. 25 For example, Ryanair recently announced
that it would dispense with its plane's window blinds, reclining
seats, seat pockets, and headrest covers.26
Low-cost and legacy carriers also rely on different route struc-
tures. Legacy carriers typically rely on a hub-and-spoke network,
while low-cost carriers tend to rely on a point-to-point route
structure. 2 ' The hub-and-spoke network allows legacy carriers to
take advantage of the high profit margins that result from long-
distance flights by large aircraft filled near capacity. 28 Hubs are
typically large airports located in densely populated areas.
Long distance flights route passengers through these hubs, and,
19 Id. at 7.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Flouris & Walker, supra note 16, at 7.
23 Id. at 6-7.
24 Id. at 7 (pointing out that "an easyjet Boeing 737-300 contains 149 seats,
whereas legacy carriers have approximately 128 seats on average").
25 Id.
26 Cnn.com, Airline Explores Tolerance for Frill-Free Flying, http://ww.cnn.
com/2004/TRAVEL/02/26/bi.no.frills.airlines.ap/index.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2006).
27 Flouris & Walker, supra note 16, at 7.
28 Id. at 5-6.
29 Kevin Bonsor, How Airlines Work: Hubs and Spokes, How STUFF WORKS,
http://travel.howstuffworks.com/airine3.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
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if necessary, "spoke" flights fly passengers to their final destina-
tions.3 ° The drawback of the hub-and-spoke network, from an
efficiency standpoint, is that turnaround times can be substan-
tially impacted by baggage handling delays and time spent wait-
ing on passengers from connecting flights.3 ' The point-to-point
route structure allows low-cost airlines to further reduce their
turnaround times by eliminating time spent waiting on passen-
gers and luggage from delayed interlining flights. 32
The business model for low-cost carriers is not uniform across
the low-cost sector, but many low-cost carriers incorporate most,
if not all, of the aforementioned practices into their business
model. The cost-saving and efficiency benefits of these practices
allow low-cost carriers to pass on savings to the consumer.
Lower fares coupled with reliable services have helped fuel the
demand for low-cost services and the recent boom in the low-
cost air transport sector in Europe.
B. Low-COST CARRIERS TODAY
Since the deregulation of the United States air transport mar-
ket in 1976, particularly in the last decade, low-cost carriers have
experienced rapid growth in terms of their air transport market
share. Low-cost carriers have captured approximately thirty-five
percent of the United States domestic market,33 and Southwest
Airlines, in terms of passenger numbers, is the fourth-largest air-
line in the United States.34
In recent years, low-cost carriers have fueled the growth of the
United States domestic air market. Since the year 2000, the
United States domestic air market has grown 8.2% in total de-
partures, 6.4% in seats and 13.5% in available seat miles, and
low-cost carriers now account for seventy-five percent of the
growth at large hub airports.15 Low-cost carriers have also had a
significant impact on tangential markets as well. In 2003, Ameri-
can low-cost carriers had orders for 400 planes, while legacy car-
riers had only 150 planes on order.36
30 Id.
31 Flouris & Walker, supra note 16, at 7.
32 Id.
33 Steven Lott & Aaron Taylor, Arrivals: New Engine Driving U.S. Domestic Growth,
AvIATION DAILY, Feb. 2, 2005, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR 2811199.
34 Turbulent Skies, supra note 9, at 68.
35 Lott & Taylor, supra note 33, at 3.
36 Turbulent Skies, supra note 9, at 68.
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The growth of low-cost carriers in Europe in recent years has
been drastic-twenty-five percent annually. 7 By 2003, low-cost
carriers, which were virtually non-existent outside of the United
Kingdom a decade ago, accounted for twenty percent of intra-
EU scheduled capacity and forty percent of services touching
the UK" s In 1996, thirteen city pairs were served by low-cost
carriers. ' By 2004, the number of city pairs served by low-cost
carriers had increased to 639,40 and between 1992 and 2000 the
number of weekly seats on EU domestic routes increased from
2,891,000 to 4,084,000, 4 1 much of this attributable to low-cost
carriers.
The rapid growth of low-cost carriers in Europe has led to a
corresponding explosion of business at secondary, regional air-
ports. Airports long ignored by flagship carriers are being colo-
nized by low-cost carriers eager to take advantage of lower
landing fees, faster turnaround times, and other benefits associ-
ated with smaller airports. The relationship between these air-
ports, which are often publicly owned, and low-cost carriers
forced the European Commission to re-examine its position on
state aid to airlines.
Ill. STATE AID
A. INTRODUCTION
The position historically taken by national governments in Eu-
rope-that airlines are a tool by which to advance certain social
and economic policies4 2-substantially impeded the liberaliza-
tion of Europe's air transport sector. Beginning in the mid-
1980s, Europe took steps to liberalize its air transport industry,
which culminated in 1993 with the adoption of a set of liberali-
zation measures known as the third package.43 The third pack-
37 INT'L CIvi. AV, \TION ORG. [ICAO)], TIE IMPACT OF LOW COST CARRIERS IN
EUROiE 3 (2003), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/ecp/CaseS-
tudies/EuropeLowCostEn.pdf [hereinafter NIPACT OF Low COST CARRIERS].
'18 2003 DG Tren Report, supra note 11, at 103.
39 Id. at 107.
40 Id.
41 ICAO, EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE OF AIR TRANSPORT LIRFRALIZATION 7 (2003),
available at http://www.icao.int/icao/enlatb/ecp/casestudies/europeliberaliza-
tionen.pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE].
12 Competition in the Air. supra note 2, at 984.
43 The third package is comprised of three Council regulations. See generally
Council Regulation 2407/92, Council Regulation of 23July 1992 on Licensing of
Air Carriers, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 2408/92, Cotucil
Regulation of 23 July 1992 on Access for Community Air Carriers to Intra-Com-
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age gave all air carriers having a Community license
unrestricted, tariff-free access to the intra-Community market.44
Since the adoption of the third package, many member states
"have established public service obligations relating to fre-
quency, service punctuality, availability of seats or preferential
rates for certain categories of users within a clear legal frame-
work."45 In addition to the market liberalization of the third
package, regulations by the Commission relating to the alloca-
tion of slots, ground handling services, and computerized reser-
vation systems have spurred the liberalization of air transport in
Europe.46
One of the more significant developments in the liberaliza-
tion of Europe's air transport sector was the European Commis-
sion's decision to take action against member states that violated
the state aid provisions in the Treaty Establishing the European
Community by giving benefits to flagship carriers. Section 3 of
the Treaty of Rome governs aid granted by states.47 Article 92,
section 1 provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in
so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible
with the common market.
48
Arguably, without strict control of state aid, liberalization of the
air transport industry would have been impossible. Before 1994,
European states commonly provided their flagship carriers with
operational aid, capital injections, exclusive rights, and other
market distorting benefits. As one commentator put it, "the
Commission's... policy for the grant of state aids has undoubt-
edly been a major factor in ensuring fair competition across the
internal market. '4 In 1994, the Commission took up the sub-
munity Air Routes, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8 (EC); Council Regulation 2409/92, Coun-
cil Regulation of 23 July 1992 on Fares and Rates for Air Services, 1992 OJ. (L
240) 15 (EC).
44 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10, 1.
45 Id.
46 Id. 2.
47 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, § 3.
48 Id. art. 92(1).
49 Daniel Calleja, Director-Designate Air Transp. Directorate, European
Comm'n, Speech before the International Aviation Club: EU/US Aviation Policy
(Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2004/
041116dc.htm.
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ject of state aid, noting that "in a situation of increased competi-
tion within the Community there is a clear need for a stricter
application of State aid rules."5' °
1. The 1994 Guidelines
The 1994 Guidelines were adopted primarily to address the
massive amounts of aid granted by European nations to their
flagship carriers. Although the scope of the 1994 Guidelines is
significant and the guidelines are worthy of considerable study,
this article will refrain from a full blown discussion of the guide-
lines and instead will highlight some of the more pertinent pro-
visions with regard to their impact on low-cost carriers.
a. Introduction
The 1994 Guidelines focus on the application of Article 92 of
the Treaty of Rome to the air transport sector.5' The guidelines
address aid granted by member states and include any activities
accessory to air transport, direct subsidization, and indirect sub-
sidization such as flight schools, duty-free shops, airport facili-
ties, franchises, and airport charges. 52 The guidelines do not
address subsidization of aircraft production: The Commis-
sion's approach in the 1994 Guidelines focused on the effect
that benefits granted by a state to an airline might have on the
market rather than the state's aims in granting the aid. The
guidelines note that "Article 92 of the Treaty does not distin-
guish between measures of State intervention by reference to
their causes or aims, but defines them in relation to their ef-
fects. ' 54 The Commission's stance indicates that regardless of a
State's aim in granting aid, the effect that the aid has on internal
markets will carry more weight than the social impact of the aid,
in the eyes of the Commission, when determining whether such
aid is prohibited by Article 92. The Commission points out that
contributions or benefits are not "State aid within the meaning
of Article 92 (1) ... unless it confers a competitive advantage to
specific undertakings to avoid having to bear costs which would
normally have had to be met out of the undertakings' own fi-
50 Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agree-
ment to State Aids in the Aviation Sector, 1994 O.J. (C 350) 5, 1 [hereinafter 1994
Guidelines].
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nancial resources, and thereby prevent market forces from hav-
ing their normal effect."55 The 1994 Guidelines address three
types of state aid to airlines: subsidization of domestic routes,
capital injections, and exclusive rights.56
b. Subsidization of Domestic Routes
The Commission took the position that, with respect to do-
mestic routes, "[d]irect aids aimed at covering operating losses
are, in general, not compatible with the common market and
may not benefit from an exemption. ' 57 However, the Commis-
sion recognized that without aid, air carriers might be forced to
discontinue routes to disadvantaged areas, thus the Commission
created two exceptions under which domestic routes could be
directly subsidized.58 The two exceptions to the ban on direct
subsidization were for "public service obligations" and "aid of a
social character. 59
In the case of a public service obligation imposed on a carrier,
"a Member State may reimburse the carrier for any loss sus-
tained in the process of operating the route."6 Routes that
qualify as a public service obligation are defined as follows:
'any obligation imposed upon an air carrier to take, in respect of
any route which it is licensed to operate by a Member State, all
necessary measures to ensure the provision of a service satisfying
fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity and pricing,
which standards the air carrier would not assume if it were solely
considering its economic interest.'61
The Commission points out that a state may impose public ser-
vice obligations "on scheduled air services to an airport serving
peripheral or development regions in its territory or on a thin
route to any regional airport in its territory provided that any
such route is considered vital for economic development of the
region in which the airport is located. '6 2 To ensure that the
market is not unduly distorted by public service aid, the Com-
mission included several conditions that must be met for public






60 Competition in the Air, supra note 2, at 1127.




pensation for public service obligations does not involve aid pro-
vided that: the carrier has been correctly selected through a call
for tender... and the maximum level of compensation does not
exceed the amount of deficit as laid down in the bid. . . ."
The second exception to direct subsidization of an air route,
aid of a social character, derives from Article 92(2) (a) of the
Treaty, which states, "aid having a social character, granted to
individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without
discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned"
is compatible with the common market."4 "The aid must have a
social character, i.e. it must, in principle, only cover specific cat-
egories of passengers travelling on a route (e.g. children, handi-
capped people, low income people). ''6 The guidelines direct
that aid of a social character must be granted to all Community
carriers providing such services.6"
c. Indirect Subsidization and the Market Economy Investor
Principal
The provisions of the 1994 Guidelines that have had the great-
est impact on the structure of the European air transport mar-
ket are those dealing with state-owned enterprises and aid
received by those entities. Cash infusions and bailouts from
states to their flagship carriers significantly distorted the market
and kept low-cost carriers and new entrants from entering the
European air transport market."7 The Commission established a
two-part test for determining whether impermissible aid is in-
volved when a state provides benefits to an entity of which it is
an owner." The first part of the test is the application of the
market economy investor principal, sometimes called the pri-
vate investor test, which asks of whether a private investor would
have made a similar investment or capital infusion. 9 If the
Commission determines that the private investor test is not satis-
fied, the Commission will then "determine whether the aid is
compatible with the common market under the derogations of
63 Id. 18.
64 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 92(2) (a).
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Article 92(3) of the Treaty .... -7' Article 92(3) of the Treaty
provides as follows:
The following may be considered to be compatible with the
common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
underemployment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of
common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance
in the economy of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activi-
ties of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest....
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision
of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission.71
In its discussion of capital infusion, the Commission describes
three common types of aid and lists factors that it will take into
account when deciding future cases.72
The first type of aid addressed is capital injection."v Accord-
ing to the 1994 Guidelines, "[c]apital injections do not involve
State aid when the public holding in a company is to be in-
creased, provided the capital injected is proportionated to the
number of shares held by the authorities and goes together with
the injection of capital by a private shareholder. . .. .-7 The
Commission will "analyze the past, present and future commer-
cial and financial situation of the company," and the private in-
vestor test will be satisfied where a normal return can be
expected within a reasonable time.v5
The 1994 Guidelines next address loan financing.76 To deter-
mine whether the private investor principal is satisfied, the Com-
mission will "assess whether the loan is made on normal
commercial terms and whether such loans would have been
available from a commercial bank."77 Among the factors the
Commission will consider are "the interest rate charged ... [,]
70 Id.
71 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 92(3).
72 1994 Guidelines, supra note 50, 26.
73 Id. § IV.1.
74 Id. 27.
75 Id. 28.
76 Id. § IV.2.
77 Id. 32.
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the security sought to cover the loan[,] ... whether the security
given is sufficient to repay the loan in full in the event of de-
fault[,] and the financial position of the company at the time
the loan is made. 78
Finally, the Commission addresses loan guarantees.7' The
Commission will only accept loan guarantees that are contractu-
ally linked to specific conditions.8 0 The amount of aid is "the
difference between the rate which the borrower would pay in a
free market and that actually obtained ... ."81 The guidelines go
on to state that " [p] ublic enterprises whose legal status does not
allow bankruptcy are in effect in receipt of permanent aid on all
borrowings equivalent to a guarantee, when such status allows
the enterprise in question to obtain credit on terms more fa-
vourable than would otherwise be available. '8 2
d. Exclusive Rights
The 1994 Guidelines also address the granting of exclusive
rights for activities accessory to air transport. The Commission
points out that an airline might realize significant financial ben-
efit constituting state aid if a state or state-owned entity operat-
ing airport infrastructure were to grant an exclusive concession
to an airline for less than market value.8 3 Consistent with the
position the Commission took with respect to indirect aid, the
Commission's position regarding exclusive aid was that "in gen-
eral terms no aid is involved where the grantee is selected in
circumstances that would be acceptable to a normal concession
grantor operating under normal market economy
condition [s] ."4
e. Conceptual Impact of the 1994 Guidelines on Low-Cost
Carriers and New Entrants
Conceptually, the impact of the Commission's guidelines on
state aid should have allowed the entry of new players into the
European air transport market. With large national carriers no
longer able to cover losses by way of the various subsidies and
benefits pointed out in the 1994 Guidelines, market conditions
78 Id.
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were ripe for the entry of the low-cost carrier. In particular, the
elimination of direct operational subsidies on domestic routes
promised to create a market for low-cost carriers.15 Large na-
tional carriers could no longer count on external aid and would
be forced to price according to their costs, creating a market for
low-cost carriers. Additionally, the 1994 Guidelines' prerequi-
sites to exceptions for public service aid and aid of a social char-
acter ensured that states could not circumvent the prohibition
of subsidization for domestic routes and that this aid was availa-
ble to all community carriers. The Commission's other limita-
tions to state aid also seemed to level the playing field and help
create a market for low-cost carriers.
The 1994 Guidelines' prohibition of cash infusions, whether
in the form of capital injections, loan financing, or loan guaran-
tees, was a key cog in the system that allowed low-cost carriers to
enter into the intra-Community air transport market. These
provisions, if followed, would force flagship carriers to tighten
their purse strings and run according to market principals. No
longer would flagship carriers be able to rely on national gov-
ernments to remain solvent.
The 1994 Guidelines' provisions on exclusive rights for activi-
ties accessory to air transport also limited the free handouts a
state could give its flagship carriers. By adopting a highest-bid-
der, market based approach to granting exclusive rights, na-
tional and flagship carriers were no longer guaranteed
monopoly profits (aid) on services like duty-free shops and bag-
gage handling. As a result, national carriers could no longer
count on profits from these services to cover losses in other ar-
eas. The Commission's position on the concession of exclusive
rights for activities accessory to air transport helped level the
playing field for new entrants into the European transport mar-
ket, particularly low-cost carriers.
When the 1994 Guidelines were released, many analysts sug-
gested that the European air transport sector would undergo
massive consolidation and that alliances of large carriers would
come to dominate the market.8 6 What the prognosticators did
not suggest was the emergence of new entrants to the market
and the growth of the low-cost carrier.
85 The low-cost model, which takes advantage of point-to-point travel, is well
suited for short domestic flights.
86 Competition in the Air, supra note 2, at 1151-52.
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2. The Impact of Liberalization and Strict Control of State Aid
Since the adoption of the third package and the 1994 Guide-
lines, the European airline sector has changed considerably. Al-
though there is no way to be sure that the third package and the
1994 Guidelines are the root cause of the last decade's changes
in the air transport industry, the growth and the changing face
of the airline industry suggest that the third package and strict
limitations on state aid have played a substantial role in the
evolution of the European air transport industry in the past
decade.
Consumers have clearly benefited since the Commission
adopted the third package and 1994 Guidelines. Benefits to the
consumer include increased competition resulting in a greater
number of carriers from which to choose, more destinations,
greater flight frequency, and increased diversity of fares.8 7 Al-
though business-class and normal economy-class fares have in-
creased by approximately forty-five and fourteen percent,
respectively, since the early nineties, promotional fares have de-
creased by fifteen percent, which amounts to approximately
thirty percent when accounting for inflation, between 1992 and
2003.8" While there is no comprehensive collection of data
showing the proportion of tickets bought in the various fare clas-
ses, increased availability of promotional fares offered by low-
cost carriers coupled with the decrease in promotional fares
bodes well for consumers.
From a purely economic point of view, it is hard to argue that
the liberalization of the air transport industry has had a negative
impact on Europe. While there are a number of collateral ef-
fects of liberalization, including increased congestion at air-
ports, environmental issues, noise pollution, and increased
volatility in the air transport market, it appears that the impact
of liberalization has been largely positive.
B. A NEW PARADIGM IN STATE AID
1. Low-Cost Airlines and Regional Development
The rapid growth of Europe's low-cost air transport sector has
led to increasing utilization of secondary and regional airports.
Regional authorities have taken notice of the impact that the
87 IMPACT OF Low COST CARRIERS, supra note 37, 6. 1.
88 EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 41, 6.5.1.
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arrival of a low-cost carrier can have on a local economy. A re-
cent opinion by the Committee of the Regions stated:
The continued development of [a network of services that pro-
vide point-to-point inter-regional air connections] has a clear
and undisputed regional dimension; it facilitates region-to-re-
gion connection; supports citizens' mobility, encourages eco-
nomic development and employment growth, promotes tourism,
aids the regeneration of peripheral and less-developed regions in
particular and thereby has a positive impact on economic, social
and territorial cohesion in Europe. 9
The Commission has recognized the benefits to the regions as
well, noting that air transport has made "a significant contribu-
tion to economic and social cohesion and to balanced develop-
ment in the regions."90  Low-cost carriers also realize the
economic impact their arrival can have on a region, and carriers
often demand reduced landing and ground handling fees, assis-
tance with marketing new routes, and other benefits in ex-
change for the promise to open new routes at an airport.9 1
Secondary airports eager to attract new scheduled routes often
oblige, promising reduced fees, faster turnaround times, and a
host of other benefits. 92
While competition and regional development should be en-
couraged, state aid issues may arise when state-owned regional
airports offer incentives to low-cost carriers in exchange for the
opening of new routes at the airport offering aid. A deal
fraught with incentives between Ireland's Ryanair and Brussels
South Charleroi Airport recently brought these issues to the
center of Europe's state aid debate.9 3 The ensuing legal battle
forced the European Commission to address the issue, and in
2005, the Commission released guidelines on the financing of
airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional
airports. 4
89 Own-Initiative Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on Low-Cost Airlines and
Territorial Development, 2004 OJ. (C 318) 7, 8.
90 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10, 1.
91 Mark Pilling & Richard Pinkham, Flight-Support; Regional Governments and Air-
ports Have Gone to Great Lengths to Attract New Air Service in Europe-But Have They
Gone Too Far, AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 1, 2003, at 63, 63-64.
92 Stevie Fenner, Airports Can Be Low Cost Too, AiRLINE Bus., Dec. 1998, at 11,
11.
93 Pilling & Pinkham, supra note 91, at 64.
94 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10, 57, 74.
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2. The Ryanair Decision
In 2002, the European Commission began investigating a
complaint against Ryanair and Brussels South Charleroi Airport
("BSCA"). The complaint was based on benefits given to Ry-
anair by the Walloon Region, owner of the Charleroi airport in-
frastructure, and BSCA, a public sector company that manages
the airport and is controlled by the Walloon Region. 5 In 2004,
the Commission ruled that certain benefits received by Ryanair
from BSCA and the Walloon Region were impermissible state
aid.96
a. Setting the Scene
Brussels South Charleroi Airport has run the Charleroi air-
port since 1991 under a fifty-year concession agreement.97
Under its agreement with the Walloon Region, BSCA has the
authority to collect sixty-five percent of airport taxes, the taxes
paid by the businesses at the airport, the revenue from ground
handling, the revenue from the sale of fuel, and fees from other
services provided to airport users.98 At the turn of the century,
BSCA was struggling to turn a profit and had no regular
carriers. 99
In 2000, BSCA was locked in a three-way battle to become Ry-
anair's first mainland European base."'0 On November 6, 2001,
Ryanair, the Region of Walloon, and BSCA reached an agree-
ment.1"' The region granted Ryanair a reduction in landing
fees of approximately fifty percent of the amount fixed and pub-
lished by the government. 11 2 BSCA agreed to pay a share of Ry-
anair's expenses associated with operations at Charleroi and
fixed ground handling services for Ryanair at ten percent of the
price publicized by BSCA for other users.'00 In addition to these
benefits, Ryanair and BSCA formed and contributed equally to a
95 Ryanair Decision, supra note 12, 12.
96 The Ryanair decision and the Commission's 2005 Guidelines, which are dis-
cussed later, rely on Article 86(2) and Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty, rather than
Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome. The provisions of Article 87 of the EC Treaty
are substantially the same as Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome.
97 Ryanair Decision, supra note 12, 1 163.
98 Id.
9 Mark Pilling, EC Investigates Ryanair/Charleroi Deal, AIRLINE Bus., Jan. 1, 2003,
at 18, 18.
100 Id.
101 Ryanair Decision, supra note 12, 11.
102 Id.
103 Id. 10.
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joint advertising and publicity company created to finance pub-
licity and marketing for Ryanair's Charleroi operations. 1°4 In
exchange for these concessions, Ryanair agreed to base between
two and four aircraft at Charleroi and to operate at least three
rotations per aircraft over a fifteen-year period. 10 5 By 2003, Ry-
anair served twelve destinations from Charleroi,'0 6 and the air-
port handled more than 2.5 million Ryanair passengers. 07
Shortly after Ryanair agreed to set up a base at Charleroi, the
European Commission received a complaint from rival low-cost
carrier Virgin Express, which is based at Brussels Zaventum air-
port. 08 In December 2002, the Commission initiated an investi-
gation of Ryanair's agreement with Brussels South Charleroi to
determine if benefits given to Ryanair by the Walloon Region
and BSCA were impermissible state aid. 109
b. Ryanair and Charleroi's Position
The thrust of the argument advanced by Ryanair and Charle-
roi was that the agreement between the companies complied
with the principle of the private investor in a market econ-
omy.110 In support of its argument, Ryanair noted that it had
received more favorable conditions from privately owned air-
ports"' and that the fifteen-year duration of the agreements is
not unusual, noting that it had agreements lasting ten to twenty
years with most of the airports it uses.1 12 Both Ryanair and
Belgium pointed out that secondary airports are not sustainable
until a critical mass of passenger traffic is obtained"' and that
secondary airports are often willing to endure losses for several
years to ensure long-term profitability. 4
Ryanair and Belgium also offered evidence showing that the
deal had exceeded the parties' expectations. In arguing that the
principal of a private investor in a market economy was satisfied
by the deals, Ryanair noted that the volume of traffic at Charle-




107 Colin Baker, Playing by the Rules, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1, 2004, at 30.
108 Id.
109 Pilling & Pinkharn, supra note 91, at 64.
110 See generally Ryanair Decision, supra note 12, §§ 3 & 4.
111 Id. 51.
112 Id. 53.
113 See id. 47, 83.
114 Id. 62.
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leroi.' 15 Ryanair also noted that the value of the Charleroi
airport had increased considerably since it began flying to Char-
leroi, pointing out the interest shown by private investors in
purchasing twenty-five percent of BSCA.1 16 Despite evidence
that Ryanair had similar deals with private airports and that the
parties' expectations had been exceeded, the European Com-
mission was unwilling to bless the Ryanair/Charleroi deal.
c. The Commission's Findings
On February 12, 2004, the European Commission released its
decision concerning aid granted by the Walloon Region and
Brussels South Charleroi Airport to Ryanair."' The Commis-
sion determined that because BSCA is controlled by the Wal-
loon Region through shareholding and bylaws and BSCA's
revenue was controlled by airport taxes fixed by the region, aid
granted to Ryanair by BSCA constituted state aid."' The Com-
mission took the position that aid in the form of reduced in
landing charges beyond the amounts published by the Walloon
Region was incompatible with the common market.' 19 The
Commission also found that discounts on ground handling ser-
vices given to Ryanair by BSCA were impermissible and stated
that the total aid to be recovered should be determined by cal-
culating the difference between BSCA's operating costs for
ground handling services provided to Ryanair and the price in-
voiced to Ryanair.120 Finally, the Commission determined that
the remaining aid granted, by BSCA to Ryanair, including mar-
keting contributions, one-shot incentives, and provisions of of-
fice space, were compatible so long as certain conditions were
met. 121
z. Application of the Private Investor Test
To determine whether the benefits given to Ryanair were per-
missible, the Commission first applied the private investor test.
115 Id. 49.
11(3 Id. 55.
117 See Ryanair Decision, supra note 12.
"1 Id. 158.
Id. 357, art. 1.
1211 Id. 357, art. 2.
121 Id. 357, art. 4. See Conditions for Aid, infra pp. 129-31, for a discussion of
the conditions that must be satisfied before aid that does not satisfy the private
investor may be declared compatible by the Commission under the Ryanair
decision.
2006] S TA TE AID 359
360 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [71
The Commission determined that BSCA's business plan did not
conform to the private investor principal and that the aid was
incompatible with Article 87(1) of the Treaty. 122 Among the ex-
ceptions the Commission took to the BSCA business plan was
BSCA's reliance on substantial revenue from hypothetical carri-
ers that would begin flying to Charleroi in the future. 12 The
Commission also found that BSCA's reliance on subsidies that
the region had not guaranteed was not in accord with the mar-
ket economy investor principal. 124  After determining that
BSCA's business plan did not conform to the market economy
investor principal, the Commission addressed whether the aid
fell within the exceptions created by Article 87(2) and 87(3) of
the Treaty.
ii. Exceptions Under Article 87(3)
The Commission determined that Article 87(2) of the Treaty
did not apply to the benefits given to Ryanair because "the aid in
question is not of a social nature, nor is it intended to make
good any damage caused by natural disasters or other excep-
tional events. ' 125 However, the Commission found that Article
87(3) (a) and (c) did apply because the "aid granted to Ryanair
could have a regional socio-economic impact in Wallonia. .. ,"
but the Commission held that the aid was "not in line with the
rules that the Commission has. . . been applying for several
years." 126 Rather than declaring the entire aid package given to
Ryanair impermissible, the Commission laid out certain condi-
tions that must be met for aid to be compatible with Article 87.
d. Conditions for Aid
The first set of conditions for aid granted by publicly owned
airports to airlines relates to contributions made by the airport
for opening a new route. 127 The Commission held that these
contributions must be limited in time, and that time period
must not exceed five years.1 28 The Commission went on to state
that the aim of the development plan should be the viability of
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validate start-up costs a posteriori. 129 Regarding the amount of
aid a publicly owned airport may grant an airline, the Commis-
sion held that the total aid for the opening of a new route must
not exceed fifty percent of the actual costs for that destina-
tion,130 and contributions from a publicly owned airport must be
"proportional and incentive in nature."'1 31
In addition to the provisions relating to the duration and the
amount of aid a publicly owned airport may grant an airline, the
Commission laid out several other conditions that must be satis-
fied when a publicly owned airport gives benefits to an airline.
The Commission held that publicly owned airports cannot con-
tribute to the opening of a new route opened as a replacement
for a route closed by an airline at the airport or another airport
"in the same economic or population catchment area. ' 132 The
Commission also discussed marketing contributions granted by
publicly owned airports, holding that marketing contributions
must be 'justified in a development plan" and "validated ... for
each route concerned."'1
33
In the case of Ryanair and Charleroi, the Commission re-
quired that at the end of the five year start-up period, any contri-
butions paid by BSCA to Ryanair that exceed the criteria
described in the decision shall be recovered by Belgium. 1 3 4
e. Implications of the Ryanair Decision
For the most part, the Commission's approach to the Ryanair
decision was consistent with the approach laid down by the 1994
Guidelines for determining whether state aid is permissible.
First the commission applies the private investor in a market
economy test. Then, if it is determined that the public authority
did not act in accordance with a private investor in a market
economy, the commission determines whether the aid meets
one of the 87(3) exceptions. The Commission's decision pro-
vides insight into several state aid principals. The decision sheds
light on how the European Commission will apply the private
investor test and explains the circumstances in which start-up
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i. Application of the Private Investor Test
In reaching its conclusion that BSCA had entered into an
agreement that no reasonably informed private investor would
enter into, the Commission provided a blueprint of how it
would apply the private investor test in cases involving start-up
aid from state-owned regional airports. The Commission's deci-
sion makes clear that when determining whether or not a state-
owned regional airport behaved as a private investor in a market
economy, it will only consider the operational parameters of the
airport offering incentives. 135 Deals between the airline receiv-
ing incentives and other airports will not be considered. 36
Thus, Ryanair's arguments that similar agreements were made
with privately owned airports fell on deaf ears. 137
The Ryanair decision also clarifies the time perspective from
which the private investor test should be applied. According to
the Commission, the proper application of the private investor
test is from the time when the financial support measures were
taken. 131 In other words, to determine "whether the [airport]
has acted like a prudent private investor in a market economy, it
will be necessary, in accordance with court case law, to place
oneself back in the context of the period during which the fi-
nancial support measures were taken."13 9 So even though Ry-
anair and Belgium were able to show that the benefits flowing
from the relationship were positive and that the investment had
a higher return than originally expected, the Commission deter-
mined that the deal between Ryanair and BSCA fell within the
meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. 4 °
The Commission's decision to determine whether BSCA ac-
ted as a private investor prospectively, that is, viewing the deal
objectively from the time it was signed, rather than retrospec-
tively, taking into account developments since the deal was en-
tered, appears unreasonable. After all, there is a strong
argument that a deal that, in reality, has proven profitable
within a reasonable amount of time and has surpassed the par-
ties' expectations was in fact reasonable at the time the deal was
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what was going through the minds of the parties when the deal
was made, it makes sense from an enforcement point of view to
evaluate contracts objectively from the time the agreement was
reached. This approach also encourages airlines and publicly
owned airports to examine their deals more thoroughly and
avoid unknowns in their business models before moving forward
with a particular agreement.
ii. When a State May Provide Incentives
The Ryanair decision also addresses when benefits granted to
an airline that do not satisfy the private investor test satisfy Arti-
cle 87(3) of the EC Treaty. Article 87(3) defines certain situa-
tions in which state aid may be considered acceptable.' 4 ' The
treaty provides:
The following may be considered to be compatible with the
common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
underemployment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of
common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance
in the economy of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activi-
ties or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not ad-
versely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the
common interest;
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where
such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in
the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common
interest;
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision
of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission. 142
The Commission determined that the incentives the Region and
BSCA provided Ryanair fell under points (a) and (c) of Article
87(3).4: However, the Commission, balancing competing inter-
ests of regional development and an open market, provided cer-
141 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Nice Consolidated Ver-
sion), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 OJ (C 325) 211 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
142 Id. art. 87(3).
143 Ryanair Decision, supra note 12, 254.
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tain criteria and limitations for aid falling within the bounds of
Article 87(3).144
In the wake of the Ryanair decision, the European Commis-
sion [EC] began preparing guidelines on the use of state funds
to finance airport infrastructure and start-up aid for new routes.
The EC's goals in drafting the guidelines were "to 'reconcile the
objectives of regional development and of fair competition' and
'bring more transparency' to the regulations." '145
3. The 2005 Guidelines
The Commission's 2005 Guidelines were drafted with several
underlying factors in mind. The Commission realized that small
airports often do not have the passenger volume to reach the
break even point 146 and that airlines may be unwilling to open
new routes from unknown and untested airports without incen-
tives to reduce their risk.14 In light of this, the Commission rec-
ognized that the aims of the EC Treaty, particularly economic,
social cohesion, and the balanced development of the regions,
can be furthered in certain instances by allowing certain state
aid exceptions.
a. Introduction
The Commission traditionally viewed airports as pieces of in-
frastructure serving different markets, but the growth of low-cost
carriers and the increasing competition between secondary air-
ports for low-cost business forced the Commission to change its
view. 4 ' Airports are now viewed as market players competing
for carriers' business. Nearly two years after the Ryanair deci-
sion, in December 2005, the European Commission released
guidelines on the financing of airports and start-up aid to air-
lines departing from regional airports.149 The 2005 Guidelines
recognize that the creation of a single European airspace is a
work in progress and that the 1994 Guidelines do not cover new
developments in airport financing and start-up aid for new
routes.15 0 In particular, the 2005 Guidelines recognize the
"44 See infra § III(B) (2) (b).
145 David Kaminsi-Morrow, EC Proposes State-Aid Limits for New Regional Airport
Routes, AIR TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 8, 2005.
146 Ryanair Decision, supra note 12, 71.
147 Id. 72.
148 Baker, supra note 107, at 30.
149 See generally 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10.
150 Id. 17.
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emergence of low-cost carriers and the "drive by airports in re-
cent years to secure new air links." '151 The 2005 Guidelines focus
on financing airports and start-up aid for new routes. 5 2 Be-
cause this Comment is concerned with the impact of the Euro-
pean Commission's state aid policy on low-cost carriers, my
discussion of the 2005 Guidelines will focus on those provisions
that seem to most impact low-cost carriers.
Like earlier guidelines and previous Commission and Court
of Justice decisions addressing state aid, the thrust of the 2005
Guidelines is the principle of a private investor in a market
economy. The 2005 Guidelines provide that the Commission
will determine whether public funding benefiting airports or
airlines constitutes illegal aid by considering "whether 'in similar
circumstances a private shareholder, having regard to the fore-
seeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, re-
gional-policy and sectoral considerations, would have subscribed
the capital in question,'"15 In other words, if an airport or air-
line receives financing or benefits from public resources under
terms more favorable than normally would be available from a
private economic operator, that airport or airline is receiving
impermissible state aid.
b. Airport Financing
The 2005 Guidelines contain important provisions relating to
benefits and funds granted to publicly owned airports by the
states that own them. The guidelines group airport activities
into four groups and address benefits and aid granted to air-
ports based on the category into which the aid is directed. The
2005 Guidelines categorize airport activities as follows:
(i) construction of airport infrastructure and equipment (run-
ways, terminals, aprons, control tower) or facilities that directly
support them (fire-fighting facilities, security or safety
equipment);
(ii) operation of the infrastructure, comprising the mainte-
nance and management of airport infrastructure;
(iii) provision of airport services ancillary to air transport, such
as groundhandling services and the use of related infrastructure,
fire-fighting services, emergency services, security services, etc;
and
151 Id. 5.
152 See generally 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10.
153 Id. 46.
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(iv) pursuit of commercial activities not directly linked to the
airport's core activities, including the construction, financing,
use and renting of land and buildings, not only for offices and
storage but also for the hotels and industrial enterprises located
within the airport, as well as shops, restaurants and car parks.' 54
The guidelines apply to "all airport activities, with the exception
of safety, air traffic control and any other activities for which a
Member State is responsible as part of its official powers as a
public authority;" the aforementioned category (iv), "pursuit of
commercial activities not directly linked to the airport's core ac-
tivities," also falls outside the scope of the 2005 Guidelines. 55
In its discussion of airport financing, the 2005 Guidelines first
address state financing of airport infrastructure, category (i).
The guidelines provide that any airport operator engaged in an
"economic activity" should "finance the costs of using or build-
ing the infrastructure it manages from its own resources. '"156
Therefore, the provision of airport infrastructure or public re-
sources to help finance airport infrastructure to an airport oper-
ator by a Member State must be in accordance with the
principle of a private investor in a market economy.1 57 Benefits
that fail to satisfy the private investor test constitute state aid un-
less the Commission determines the aid satisfies the exceptions
articulated by Articles 87(3) (a), (b), or (c) or Article 86(2) of
the Treaty.158
Next, the 2005 Guidelines address aid for the operation of
airport infrastructure, category (ii), and provide that airport op-
erators "should meet the normal costs of running and maintain-
ing airport infrastructure from its own resources.' ' 5 ' However,
the Commission creates exceptions for operating subsidies "on
the basis of Articles 87(3) (a) or (c), under certain conditions, in
disadvantaged regions, or on the basis of Article 86(2) if it meets
certain conditions...160
In addressing aid for airport services ancillary to air transport,
category (iii), the 2005 Guideline's note that groundhandling
services at airports serving over two million passengers annually
are a commercial activity open to competition pursuant to Di-
154 Id. 53.








rective 96/67/EC."' The guidelines require that "ground-
handling services must be self-financing and must not be cross-
subsidized by the airport's other commercial revenue or by pub-
lic resources granted to it as airport authority or operator of a
service of general economic interest" when an airport serves
more than two million passengers annually." 2 On the other
hand, the guidelines allow airports that serve fewer than two mil-
lion passengers annually to offset groundhandling losses with
revenue from other commercial activities. 1I 3 Presumably, other
ancillary services are handled similarly.
c. Start-Up Aid
The Commission, responding to the outcry following the Ry-
anair decision, published guidelines for determining when aid
that does not satisfy the private investor test, thus failing to com-
ply with Article 87(1) of the Treaty, falls within the provision of
Article 87(3). The 2005 Guidelines list a number of conditions
which must be met before the Commission will approve start-up
aid that does not comply with the private investor test.
i. Parties
The 2005 Guidelines strictly limit who may benefit from and
grant start-up aid. The Commission requires that only carriers
with a valid operating license issued by a Member State accord-
ing to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 may receive
aid. 1 4 The next requirement relates to the size of the airport
the new route will service. Airports may only grant aid where
the route links a category C airport, a "large regional airport"
with an annual passenger volume between one and five million,
or category D airport, a "small regional airport" with an annual
passenger volume of less than one million, to another EU air-
port. '1 5 However, the Commission states that exceptions might
be made when aid is granted for routes between airports having
an annual passenger volume of five to ten million, when one of
the airports served is located in a disadvantaged region or when
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ii. New Routes
The guidelines also limit what routes may receive aid. Before
offering aid, the public body offering the start-up aid must
"carry out an analysis of the impact of the new route on compet-
ing routes prior to granting start-up aid."1 67 The 2005 Guide-
lines require that aid will only be allowed when the opening of a
new route will lead to an increase in the net volume of passen-
gers to an airport. 6 ' The guidelines also state that "start-up aid
must not be paid when the new air route is already being oper-
ated by a high-speed rail service under the same criteria.' 1 69 In
addition, the 2005 Guidelines require that airlines provide a
business plan showing the long-term viability of a new route
when the airline proposes service to a public body offering to
grant start-up aid for the opening of the new route.17 °
iii. Long-Term Viability and Degressiveness
The guidelines require that the route receiving aid ultimately
prove profitable. 171 To ensure that public resources are not
drained by unprofitable routes, the Commission requires start-
up aid to be degressive and limited in duration. 72 The Commis-
sion also requires that the amount of aid granted be linked to
the number of passengers transported. 173 As the number of pas-
sengers on the route increases and the route approaches the
break even point, the amount of aid must decrease. 74 In most
instances, "degressive aid may be granted for a maximum period
of three years."' 175 However, the guidelines further limit the du-
ration of start-up aid requiring that "the aid should be stopped
once the objectives in terms of passengers have been reached or
when the line breaks even, even if this is achieved before the
end of the period initially foreseen.' '1 76 The guidelines also limit
the amount of aid, referred to as "intensity," that an airline may













may not exceed fifty percent of eligible costs (marketing, adver-
tising, etc.) for a given year, and the total amount of aid may not
exceed thirty percent of eligible costs.' 79
iv. Compensation for Additional Start-up Costs
The 2005 Guidelines also limit the operations that aid may
fund, requiring that the amount of aid be "strictly linked to the
additional start-up costs incurred in launching the new route...
which the air operator will not have to bear once it is up and
running"-costs like marketing and advertising or installation
costs. '8 The Commission specifically states that aid cannot be
granted for standard operating costs. 1"
v. Non-Discriminatory Allocation and Publicity
The 2005 Guidelines insist that "any public body which plans
to grant start-up aid to an airline for a new route... must make
its plans public in good time and with adequate publicity to en-
able all interested airlines to offer their services."' 18 2 To ensure
that the market is not distorted by aid, the Commission requires
states to "ensure that the list of routes receiving aid is published
annually for each airport, in each instance indicating the source
of public funding, the recipient company, the amount of aid
paid and the number of passengers concerned."'8 3
4. The Impact of Ryanair and the New Guidelines on Low-Cost
Carriers and Publicly Owned Secondary Airports
Although the 2005 Guidelines purport to adopt "a neutral
stance on the question of whether a State opts for public or pri-
vate ownership of airports," '84 the guidelines offer a significant
competitive advantage to privately owned secondary airports.
While there is no way to know what effect the 2005 Guidelines
will actually have, low-cost carriers and regional airports are wor-
ried that the new guidelines will adversely affect their businesses
and "that without the ability to strike aggressive deals many
178 Routes from disadvantaged regions and sparsely populated regions are sub-
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routes will not be started.'u8 5 Likewise, regional governments
are concerned that regional development may be hindered by
the inability of regional airports to open new routes. 86
The 2005 Guidelines create bright line boundaries limiting
the amount of state funded incentives an airport can offer an
airline. In effect, the Commission in the 2005 Guidelines has
made a blanket ruling on all future aid cases regardless of the
airport and region's individual situation or the individual facts
of a case. Unless a publicly owned regional airport's start-up aid
package falls within the limits of the 2005 Guidelines, regardless
of the benefits to the region or the individual circumstances sur-
rounding the deal, publicly owned regional airports will be una-
ble to go forward with their offer. This puts publicly owned,
regional airports at a significant disadvantage to privately owned
airports, which are not limited by the 1994 or 2005 Guidelines
on state aid.
a. Arbitrary Limitations on the Size of Airports that May
Offer Aid
The guidelines approve start-up aid only at airports serving
fewer than five million passengers annually. Limiting aid to air-
ports serving five million passengers per year is an arbitrary ex-
ception to the principal of the market investor in a private
economy. By limiting the availability of aid, the Commission ig-
nores factors such as the size of existing airport infrastructure,
the utilization of existing airport infrastructure, and other fac-
tors contributing to the critical mass necessary for a given air-
port to attain profitability. A more sensible approach to
determining whether an airport may grant start-up aid would be
to examine the individual characteristics of the airport and de-
termine whether state aid might be necessary to reach that air-
port's critical mass.
b. Publicly Owned Airports' Ability to Strike Deals
Provisions relating to the intensity and duration of aid also
put publicly owned secondary airports at a disadvantage. A pri-
vately owned airport well-versed in the guidelines would likely
be willing to offer incentives just outside of the boundary cre-
ated by the guidelines to lure an airline to its airport.




Although it may make sense from an enforcement point of
view to create bright line boundaries within which publicly
owned airports must operate, strict boundaries like the 2005
Guidelines relating to start-up aid give privately owned airports a
competitive advantage. Not only do the 2005 Guidelines give
privately owned airports a negotiating advantage in terms of
flexibility, but they also provide an advantage in terms of infor-
mation. The transparency that the guidelines require and the
limitations placed on publicly owned airports give privately
owned airports tremendous leverage and bargaining power.
Ironically, the 2005 Guidelines that aim to rid the market of dis-
tortion in fact distort the market by giving privately owned air-
ports leverage and information that would be unavailable in an
undistorted market.
c. Poaching by Private Airports
The guidelines allowing aid "only to the opening of new
routes . . . which will lead to an increase in the net volume of
passengers," in particular those provisions that prohibit aid
which encourages "relocation of traffic which is unjustified with
regard to the frequency and viability of existing services leaving
from another airport in the same city, the same conurbation or
the same airport system which serve the same or a similar desti-
nation under the same criteria," '187 leave publicly owned secon-
dary airports open to poaching by privately owned airports
serving the same area. A publicly owned airport limited by state
aid regulations may lack the financial flexibility to prevent a pri-
vately owned airport from luring a carrier away from the pub-
licly owned airport. Then, after the carrier has been lured away,
the publicly owned airport will be unable to reestablish the
route with another carrier because of the "increase in net vol-
ume" limitations. While this situation is unlikely to arise be-
tween two airports located in the same nation, it is conceivable
that a public and private airport that are both located in the
same region but across the border from each other might en-
gage in competition for the same airline's business.
d. Improvements to Existing Air Services
The provisions of the 2005 Guidelines that limit start-up aid to
"new routes or new schedules .. which will lead to an increase
187 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10, 1 79(c).
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in the net volume of passengers"'18 might limit a region's ability
to improve existing air services. For example, a region hoping
to expand service at a regional airport may be unable to finance
airport expansions that would allow the airport to upgrade from
propeller service to jet service due to the 2005 Guidelines'
restrictions.
e. Favoritism of Rail
The 2005 Guidelines also favor high-speed rail alternatives
over the establishment of new air routes. 189 While this favorit-
ism is noble, particularly since high-speed rail has received
heavy public funding,19 ° a strong argument can be made that
favoring the rail industry over establishing new air routes mocks
market liberalization. Now, rather than allowing low-cost carri-
ers to tap new markets, which would give consumers the option
for low-cost, rapid, point-to-point air travel, the 2005 Guidelines'
provisions prohibiting start-up aid in regions with access to high-
speed rail limits the ability of low-cost carriers to open new
routes.
f. Increased Litigation
The Commission's decision to involve itself in aid to airports
and start-up aid to low-cost carriers puts publicly owned airports
and low-cost carriers that enter into deals with publicly owned
regional airports at a significant risk of litigation stemming from
complaints by rival airlines and privately owned airports. The
potential for litigation may have a chilling effect, encouraging
low-cost carriers to seek deals with similarly situated privately
owned airports rather than with publicly owned airports.
The impact of the advantages offered by the new guidelines
may be blunted by the fact that "[m] ost small airports in the EU
are still owned and operated by public authorities in the public
interest," '19 1 but the fact remains that the 2005 Guidelines create
a substantial advantage for privately owned secondary airports.
This, in turn, limits the flexibility and savings available to low-
cost carriers when establishing new routes. While the 2005
Guidelines may significantly affect the abilities of low-cost carri-
188 Id.
189 See id. (stating "start-up aid must not be paid when the new air route is
already being operated by high-speed rail service under the same criteria").
190 Kaminski-Morrow, supra note 145, at 19.
191 2005 Guidelines, supra note 10, 8.
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ers and publicly owned regional airports, there are no guaran-
tees that these effects will materialize. Ryanair has appealed the
EC's 2004 decision to the European Court of Justice, and the
outcome may force the EC to revise the guidelines. But as they
stand, the 2005 Guidelines substantially hinder the competitive-
ness of regional airports and limit the options available to low-
cost carriers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The European air transport sector has seen significant change
in the first decade post-liberalization. The expansion of low-cost
carriers across the intra-Community market promises to bring
lower fares, greater choice to consumers, increased efficiency in
the air transport sector, and a more reliable network. However,
the entry of the low-cost carrier into the intra-Community mar-
ket, which was made possible by European Commission's 1994
Guidelines on state aid in the aviation sector, will likely be hin-
dered by the Commission's most recent guidelines relating to
the financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing
from regional airports.
The Commission's one-size-fits-all approach to airport financ-
ing and start-up aid leaves publicly owned airports without the
flexibility to compete with privately owned airports. As a result,
low-cost carriers have diminished bargaining power, and their
ability to strike aggressive deals is hindered. Conceptually, this
might lead to higher operating costs, which would then be
passed on to the consumer, leading to higher ticket prices and
less demand for low-cost services. The Commission's approach
also undercuts the States' ability to foster regional development
and the development of low-cost air travel.
A more sensible approach to determining whether aid and
benefits constitute impermissible aid is to consider each case in-
dividually. While this may lead to greater administrative over-
sight and bureaucratic delays, a system can be implemented to
streamline the process.
One possible solution is to set up a system for approval of aid
prior to the finalization of a deal between a publicly owned air-
port and an airline. This would involve the creation of a system
for notice and approval of proposed aid packages. In determin-
ing whether an aid package falls within Article 87(3), the Com-
mission should examine the existing infrastructure, the
utilization of existing infrastructure, and the unique situation of
the region served by the airport offering aid, basing its decision
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on the individual facts underlying each agreement rather than
on arbitrary guidelines. The procedure might include an op-
portunity for the parties to be heard, as well as some sort of
appeal procedure. The potential for bureaucratic disaster is
great, but an efficient, streamlined procedure is possible.
Despite the Commission's 2005 Guidelines and the Ryanair
decision, the dispute over benefits given to airlines by publicly
owned airports is far from over. Ryanair has appealed the Com-
mission's 2004 decision, and subject to the Court ofJustice's rul-
ing, the Commission's position with respect to start-up aid for
airlines may change. For the time being, however, the Commis-
sion's stance on state aid seems to put publicly owned airports
and low-cost carriers who are dependant on secondary airports
to keep costs low at a significant disadvantage in the air trans-
port market, tipping the playing field in favor of privately owned
airports and large well-established carriers. The full impact of
the 2005 Guidelines on low-cost carriers has yet to be seen, but
as they stand, the guidelines threaten the rapid growth that low-
cost carriers have enjoyed in the European Union over the past
decade.
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